What if I’m wrong…

Some thoughts, writ­ing while sick and dis­tracted isn’t the easiest…

‘Isa: […] You equiv­o­cated between value–opin­ions and val­ues, between opin­ions about what’s right or wrong and what’s really right or wrong. You see, dif­fer­ent cul­tures may have dif­fer­ent opin­ions about what’s morally right and wrong, just as they have dif­fer­ent opin­ions about what hap­pens after death […] What’s believed to be right and what really is right aren’t nec­es­sar­ily the same, just as what’s believed to exist after death and what really exists aren’t nec­es­sar­ily the same. We can be wrong about it. Just because I may believe there is no hell doesn’t mean there is none of that I won’t go there … [1]

I’m sure we could extend the above to include reli­gious or philo­soph­i­cal incli­na­tions, in fact, I think we will.

There are a lot of bad philo­soph­i­cal sys­tems out there. I don’t mean bad as in morally wrong, but bad as in poorly rea­soned and sup­ported. The mark of a lot of these philoso­phies is self-contradiction. I first heard the argu­ment, ‘You believe in X because you were brought up in cul­ture C’ from Richard Dawkins, yet I’m sure it wasn’t him who first for­mu­lated it.  Mind you, it’s the sort of poor rea­son­ing entirely con­sis­tent with his phi­los­o­phy. The first thing about this is that it’s a self-contradiction. Isn’t this view but one more among a plethora of views that are the result of cul­ture? It is with this an empty answer; it nei­ther dis­proves nor proves belief X. Equally, if it is claimed that it is not a prod­uct of a spe­cific cul­ture, then it should be said that if Dawkins (for instance) was able to break his con­di­tion­ing, why shouldn’t any­one else be able to? Ravi Zacharias is an oper­a­tional exam­ple of this break­ing of cul­tural con­di­tion­ing. Are not those Chris­tians who become athe­ists fur­ther exam­ple of this? Believ­ing oth­er­wise (that one can’t break their cul­ture) seems entirely unrea­son­able to me.

If one is a lover of wis­dom, I don’t see why being brought up with X beliefs should be any obsta­cle to the truth, assum­ing one is sincere.

Espe­cially when one is answer­ing the ques­tion, ‘What if you’re wrong?!’ Seems strange to me why you would answer the ques­tion in such a wrong, con­vo­luted way when it’s much eas­ier just to say, straight for­wardly, ‘well if I’m wrong then I’m wrong and sub­ject to con­se­quences’. Then again, I guess that depends if you believe we can know truth… Speak­ing of self-contradictory philosophies.

A bet­ter thought tomorrow.…

[1] Peter Kreeft, A Refu­ta­tion of Moral Rel­a­tivism (San Fran­cisco: Igna­tious press, 1999),  82.

Related posts:

  1. Could I be Wrong?
  2. Book Review: Get­ting the Ref­or­ma­tion Wrong by James Payton

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