Truth as a symptom
“The preoccupation with ‘truth’ among emergents has often been pushed on them by their conservative critics, primarily because truth is a central concern of theirs. And their preoccupation with truth is a symptom of their modernism. They want the Bible to be unswervingly factual (here, truth equals fact), for if it is, then its claims about eternal salvation cannot be ignored. So they publish books against emergents titled Truth and the New Kind of Christian and The Truth War, and blogs excoriate the emergents on the issue of truth.“[1]
The above comes from Tony Jones book The New Christians: Dispatches from the Emergent Frontier. What Jones says worries me, not least because this is yet another blog ‘excoriating’ him and by proximity emergent Christians on the truth question.
Al Mohler, in discussing the role truth plays within the emergent church, has warned that, “if you get the truth question wrong, you’re going to be aberrant in every dimension of the life of the church and in your personal understanding of Christianity”. It comes as no surprise then that the “conservative critics” of the emergent church concern themselves with how the emergent church views and understands truth (The orthodox church adheres to the correspondence theory of truth); the issue is paramount. This ‘preoccupation’ with the truth is not, contrary to Jones’ claim, the symptom of one’s modernism, it seems as if emergent speakers group together everything that came before postmodernism as ‘modernism,’ this is incorrect. What’s disturbing about the quote above is its implications. It implies that emergent Christians would not normally be concerning themselves with the truth question. It further implies that where the Bible speaks about “eternal salvation”, emergents would take a stance where “we could be wrong, we could be right;” they would call this epistemological humility.
We immediately turn our attention to two questions: (1) what is the correspondence theory of truth and (2) because emergent Christians adopt the presuppositions of postmodernism, what does postmodernism say about the ‘truth question’?
According to J.P. Moreland, “In its simplest form, the correspondence theory of truth says that a proposition is true just in case it corresponds to reality, when what it asserts to be the case is the case. More generally, truth obtains when a truth-bearer stands in an appropriate correspondence relation to a truth maker”.[2] We’ll need to unpack this statement. A truth bearer is a proposition, the content of a sentence but not the statement, sentence or piece of language itself. “For example, ‘It is raining’ and ‘Es regnet’ are two different sentences that express the same proposition”.[3] A truth maker is a fact, facts are what make the truth bearer (the proposition) true or false. A fact expresses a real state of affairs in the world. Sentences, which express propositions, are “linguistic objects consisting in a sense-perceptible string of markings formed according to a culturally arbitrary set of syntactical rules, a grammatically well-formed string of spoken or written scratchings/sounds”.[4] What this means, then, is that a statement is true or false according to its correspondence with reality, independent of the perception or views of the person making the statement. What then of postmodernism?
“On a postmodernist view, there is no such thing as objective reality, truth, value, reason, and so forth. All these are social constructions, creations of linguistic practices, and as such are relative not to individuals, but to social groups that share a narrative. Postmodernism denies the correspondence theory, claiming that truth is simply a contingent creation of language that expresses customs, emotions, and values embedded in a community’s linguistic practices. For the postmodernist, if one claims to have the truth in the correspondence sense, this assertion is a power move that victimizes those judged not to have the truth”.[5] Within postmodernism there is a strong emphasis on language, being “inside” language and as a result, we are prevented from knowing the world as it actually is. R. Scott Smith notes that, “there are several core philosophical ideas driving postmodern thought:
- There is a real world that exists, but all we can know about it is what we know by our talking about it.
- This is because we are on the “inside” of language and cannot get out to know the real world as it truly (i.e., objectively) is.
- There is no universal truths that we many know–true for all people in all places at all times. If we could know such things, this would mean that we could know some things that are true regardless of language use. But this is not possible.
- Thus, there is no essence, or nature, to language. There are only many languages
- Meaning is not a matter of what a person meant by a statement, that is, his or her intentions in making the statement. If it were, we each could have that same intention in our minds. But that would mean that there is a universal truth we could know apart from how we use language. Instead, meaning is just a matter of how words are used within a social setting, or community, according to the grammatical rules for its language.
- Since we cannot know the real world as it truly is, and our only contact with it is by how we talk, each community “makes” its own social world by the use of its language.[6]
Thus, while a real world objectively exists, we cannot come into contact with this real world because we are bound by language conventions, social conventions, cultural conventions, etc. As truth is the product of language, society and culture, who are we to judge another culture? Who is to say that the truth claims of one culture are applicable to the truth claims of another culture? We cannot know. Thus, while an objective world does exist, we are resigned to forever interpret that world, unable to know it as it truly is. Truth claims then become competing interpretations, all of which are equal. The view above is immediately self refuting for it is assumed to be absolutely true that we cannot know the real world as it exists, which would be an actual state of affairs for the real world as it truly (objectively) is. Thus, the very thing it claims we cannot know, it assumes to know. Furthermore, this results in the absurdity of knowing the real world as it truly is, a real world which has the feature of being unknowable.
Ultimately, such a view confuses our perception of reality and truth with what reality and truth actually are. The most obvious confusion is between the arbitrary nature of words, sentences, languages, signs, etc., (semiotics) and those things they describe. Using the greenness of grass as an example, Moreland writes, “Grass’ being green makes Sally’s thought true even if Sally is blind and cannot tell whether or not it is true, and even if Sally does not believe the thought. Reality makes thoughts true or false. A thought is not made true by someone believing it or by someone being able to determine whether or not it is true”.[7] To bring to attention the less obvious, contrary to the presuppositions of postmodernism, sentences — language — is not necessary to express propositional content, thus we find ourselves outside language. As an example, babies think prior to their learning a language. It’s very clear that babies perceive and understand the world, perhaps describing it in gibberish until such time it’s taught language. Thus the only viable position for the postmodernist would be to adopt an extreme skepticism, how can we be sure we’re perceiving the real world? Though it seems to me this skepticism is wholly unnecessary on the basis of our continued (successful) interaction with the world.
Understanding the postmodern position with respect to truth, we turn to the emergent Christian.
Keeping in line with the postmodern view of truth, Jones denies that there is such a thing as objective, universal truth, “in Jones’ opinion, in a postmodern world there is no objective, universal truth. Instead, all is relative.… Jones writes that postmodernism leaves us in a relativistic situation.… perception is reality”.[8] Jones commits the same error, confusing perception with what a thing actually is. In The New Christians Jones brings attention to historical perspectives and frameworks. We all approach an event, the resurrection and empty tomb, for example, with certain presuppositions and its those presuppositions which dictate our reaction to the event. While this is true to a degree, it is not so true that it negates our ability to know the world as it actually is. Keeping in mind, of course, that postmodernism is susceptible to the same criticisms it levels towards other ‘metanarratives’. What answer is there in saying, ‘I might be wrong that you’re wrong, or I might be right that you’re wrong, either way we’ll never know so here, adopt my world view!’ In the end, the emergent Christian denies the possibility of any universal or absolute truth.
This leads to a couple clear implications. Firstly, that within emergent literature there is great emphasis placed on journey, rather than destination; journeys are interpretations, the destination can’t be objectively known. This emphasis on journey necessitates the view that it doesn’t matter what journey one is on (Christian, Islamic, Judaic, Buddhist, Hindu, etc.), as long as one is sincere in that journey, God will honor that person. Contrast what David Well’s has said about the notion of journey in Pilgrims Progress with what Spencer Burke of theooze.com has said of the emergent journey:
There really is a difference between Bunyan’s notion of spiritual pilgrimage and the postmodern idea of spiritual journey.… The point of spirituality is in the experience of the journeying, not in the purpose of reaching the destination. For Bunyan, the pilgrimage is about the certain knowledge that Christians have of “the better country” to which they travel and of the way in which they must conduct themselves on the journey in preparation for the One to whom they are traveling.[9]
Tour guides don’t feel free to deviate from the “route” other Christians have set. What’s more, they’re apt to impose that same kind of rigid structure on others. Becoming a traveler, however, enables you to be true to yourself .… As a traveler, I am free to love and to be loved. I’m not worried about taking a wrong step or losing my position, I’m just one more person on the journey–a beloved child of God.[10]
Aptly summarized by Kevin DeYoung, “for emerging Christians, the journey of the Christian life is less about our pilgrimage through this fallen world that is not our home, and more about the wild, uncensored adventure of mystery and paradox. We are not tour guides who know where we are going and stick to the course”.[11] What worries me is this idea that Burke (and by extension, emergents who listen to Burke) is not worried about taking a wrong step or losing his position. No mention of working out our salvation with fear and trembling (Philippians 2:12). No mention of ‘running the race; (Hebrews 12; races are, as we all know, laid down on set courses with definitive destinations in mind). No mention that the ‘gate is narrow’ and many miss it (Matthew 7). I suppose in the words of Eckhart Tolle, “Love is not selective.… It is not exclusive”.[12]
Secondly, as mentioned above by DeYoung, there is an increased emphasis on mystery and paradox. As Jones has stated, “so a divine human being (Jesus) is truth. God is transcendent and immanent. Truth is both reliable and contextual. Relativism is relatively absolute. Paradoxes abound in the Christian faith“[13] and the strong implication is that these should all be embraced. The problem with this statement is the context within which it is made. Mystery and paradox, for the emergent Christian, is to be enjoyed and pursued but never figured out. To make any definite claims about any of the above — Christs nature, the ability to know a transcendent, imminent God, the nature of truth and relativism — is to claim we can know something about the world as it truly is, which is not only impossible but a power play. To claim that we can know a thing is simply arrogant and ignorant, we cannot be sure that we know a thing, we’ve been wrong in the past, after all. Whereas the orthodox Christian will develop the doctrine of the Hypostatic Union, or a doctrine of revelation, the emergent Christian will simply revel in mystery and paradox, liberation takes the form of ignorance, not knowing.
Andy Crouch of Christianity Today wrote an article titled The Emergent Mystique, an interview with Rob and Kristin Bell. Crouch writes, “the Bells started questioning their assumptions about the Bible itself—“discovering the Bible as a human product,” as Rob puts it, rather than the product of divine fiat. “The Bible is still in the center for us,” Rob says, “but it’s a different kind of center. We want to embrace mystery, rather than conquer it. I grew up thinking that we’ve figured out the Bible,” Kristen says, “that we knew what it means. Now I have no idea what most of it means. And yet I feel like life is big again—like life used to be black and white, and now it’s in color.“[14] This seems to me to be the wrong approach, however. When I have ‘no idea’ what most of something means, I’m not embracing it’s mystery, I’m embracing my own ignorance. I’m more in love with the idea than with attempting in the very minimum a basic understanding of the idea in question. I appreciate the mysteries of the Christian faith more, now that I have even a limited understanding of what they are.Whereas before any appreciation I had would have been directed at the mystery simply because it was a mystery, not because I understood the mystery. Ultimately, such an emphasis on mystery and paradox might simply be a way to avoid tough issues such as eternal salvation, as mentioned by Jones above.
We must realize however that there is a difference between embracing and celebrating mysteries and paradoxes and embracing outright absurdities and contradictions. Notably, the emergent church has done away with the law of non-contradiction which states that a thing cannot be both ‘A’ and ‘non-A’ (truth cannot be both relative (A) and absolute (non-A), it is either/or, not both/and).While it may be a mystery and apparent paradox that Jesus is both divine and human, properly understood it is not a contradiction. God may be transcendent and beyond understanding, but through His revelation to us He is not unknowable or unapproachable, again we find a mystery or an apparent paradox, but no contradiction. On the other hand when discussing the nature of truth and relativism, Jones posits absurdities and contradictions, rather than mysteries and apparent paradox’s. If by saying “truth is reliable and contextual” Jones intends to say “relative and absolute,” then Jones violates the law of non-contradiction. We arrive at the same conclusion when Jones says that “relativism is relatively absolute,” a logical impossibility. It’s very shallow theology, which is unfortunate as the prominent representatives of the emergent church are far from uneducated.
Thirdly and lastly, the denial of any universal, objective truth removes the immediacy and force of the claims inherent within Christianity (such as eternal salvation being exclusive). It’s not simply that everything is questioned. It’s that everything is questioned and given an answer: that may be good for them, but not necessarily for me. The danger, of course, is that one can still say, ‘you must accept Christ’ but such a statement would be without foundation. As Brian McLaren always likes to drive home, ‘we’ve been wrong in the past’ well, what if we’re completely wrong? Either way, according to postmodernity, we’ll likely never know.
So again I say, is it any wonder we’re concerned with truth?
[1] Tony Jones, The New Christians: Dispatches from the Emergent Frontier (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2008), 154.
[2] J.P. Moreland, “Truth, Contemporary Philosophy, and the Postmodern Turn,” Whatever Happened to Truth? (Illinois: Crossway, 2005), 76.
[3] Ibid., 76.
[4] Ibid., 77
[5] Ibid., 79.
[6] R. Scott Smith, Truth and the New Kind of Christian: The Emerging Effects of Postmodernism In the Church (Illinois: Crossway, 2005), 30.
[7] Truth, Contemporary Philosophy, and the Postmodern Turn,” 77
[8] Truth and the New Kind of Christian, 70.
[9] David F. Wells, Above all Earthly Pow’rs (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 122 (emphasis original). Quoted in Kevin DeYoung and Ted Kluck, Why We’re Not Emergent: by Two Guys who Should be (Chicago: Moody Publishers, 2008), 33–34.
[10] Spencer Burke with Colleen Pepper, Making Sense of the Church (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2003), 45. Quoted in Kevin DeYoung and Ted Kluck, Why We’re Not Emergent: by Two Guys who Should be (Chicago: Moody Publishers, 2008), 32.
[11] Kevin DeYoung and Ted Kluck, Why We’re Not Emergent: by Two Guys who Should be (Chicago: Moody Publishers, 2008), 32.
[12] Eckhart Tolle, The Power of Now (Vancouver: Namaste Publishing, 1999), 155.
[13] The New Christians, 162.
[14] Andy Crouch, “The Emergent Mystique,” Christianity Today, November 1st, 2004, http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2004/november/12.36.html?start=2 (accessed August 1st, 2009).
Related posts:
- Truth and unbelief
- Galileo: Truth isn’t Absolute
- Unable to Prepare for the Journey?
- The Bible, Propaganda?
- John Wilkinson: “Truth is Manufactured”

