Wilson vs. Hitchens: Is Christianity Good for the World?
A transcript of the debate (.pdf) can be found here.… (Read more)
Peter Kreeft, Refuting an Argument: Second Fallacy
Last week I wrote about the fallacy of assuming that by refuting an argument’s conclusion, there argument is therefore refuted. This week I want to write about the opposite fallacy, namely, that by refuting an argument you’ve presumably refuted the conclusion1. Finding examples for this fallacy is easier than the last, so lets consider a few examples.
Example 1:
- God didn’t answer my prayer,
- Therefore, God doesn’t exist.
Example 2:
- Nature is beautiful,
- Therefore, God exists.
Example 3:
- You have a mustache,
- Therefore you must own a dog.
None of the conclusions above follow from the premise that precedes them. An unanswered prayer doesn’t prove atheism, the beauty of nature doesn’t prove theism, and having a mustache doesn’t have anything to do with owning a pet; each conclusion is effectively a non-sequitur. As bad as these arguments are, the conclusions may still be true because the conclusions aren’t dependent upon the argument … (Read more)
Peter Kreeft, Refuting an Argument
On my down-time I’ve been going through Peter Kreeft’s Socratic Logic (3rd edition). The section I’ve just finished reading1 dealt with ‘procedural fallacies’, and two that I want to look at have to do specifically with refuting an argument, or rather, thinking we have when there is a good chance we haven’t.
The fallacy I’m going to examine in this post is the mistake of thinking that just because you’ve refuted an argument’s conclusion, you’ve refuted the argument. Kreeft writes:
We do not refute an argument simply by refuting its conclusion. What refutes an argument is an analysis of the argument that finds in it a term used ambiguously or a false premise or a logical fallacy, thus showing how the argument went wrong and why it does not prove its conclusion. What refutes an argument’s conclusion (which is a single proposition) is another argument proving the contradictory … (Read more)
John Wilkinson: “Truth is Manufactured”
“Truth is not grasped but manufactured.“
–John Wilkinson, No Argument for God, p. 38
Really? Truth is manufactured? Wilkinson proves his point with a rather odd argument, which I’m going to discuss below. Before that, though, I must wonder if Wilkinson, when writing the above, fully thought out the implications of what he was saying. I suggest that if it is ‘true’ that “truth is not grasped but manufactured,” then there is no reason to take this statement seriously. Go figure. (As a prefatory note, I hope I’ve misunderstood Wilkinson.)
Actually, Wilkinson moves from the proposition “reason is something constructed within our minds“1 to the conclusion you read above. Quite a massive leap in logic. To validate his point he references William James, and to demonstrate his point he discusses the sentence “January is cold“2. Now a word before I continue; because of the wording … (Read more)
Block-Logic vs. Step-Logic
For a while now there has been an e-mail going around, extolling the ‘virtue’ (I suppose) of Hebrew ‘block-logic’ over against the ‘step-logic’ of the Greeks. For quick reference, the e-mail is as follows:
“For this is what the LORD Almighty, the God of Israel, says: “Houses, fields and vineyards will again be bought in this land” (Jer. 32:15).
In the scriptures we discover a difference in the way the Hebrew mind viewed things compared to the way many Westerners relate to God. Hebrews used something called Block Logic. That is, concepts were expressed in self-contained units or blocks of thought. These blocks did not necessarily fit together in any obvious rational or harmonious pattern.
Greek logic, which has influenced the Western world, was different. The Greeks often used tightly contained step logic which reason a premise to a conclusion, each step linked tightly to the next in coherent, rational, logical … (Read more)
Is Everyone an Atheist?
Somewhere, on some internet forum, someone has said something along the lines of ‘everyone is an atheist’. I know it’s the case because someone said this very thing to me, and then neglected reply to the thoughts I had provided them. I’m going to provide some different thoughts here as we consider the question, “is everyone an atheist?” As always, we begin with some definitions:
Theism: The affirmation of the existence of God.
Atheism: The denial of the existence of God.
As might also be apparent, ‘atheism’ is the negation of theism, hence, ‘a-theism’ (a-, meaning, not).
Typically the argument goes something like this: “Even though you believe in YHWH, you don’t believe in Zeus, so you’re an atheist (to the adherent of Greek mythology),” or “Even though you believe in YHWH, you don’t believe in Allah, so you’re an atheist (to the Muslim)”. Does this claim make sense? I don’t … (Read more)
‘Ought’ and Naturalism
If naturalism is true, can there then be ‘ought’ statements which are morally objectively binding? By ‘ought’ I mean a ’ moral obligation’: murder is wrong, therefore I ought not murder. Disobeying the law is immoral, therefore I ought to obey the law. Slander is wrong, therefore I ought not slander, etc. These sorts of moral obligations I understand as objective, or absolute. They hold authority over human existence, and find their origin outside of the human mind. They are part of the fabric of the universe, unchanging. If naturalism is true then it seems to me this can’t be the case, and not for lack of trying.
If naturalism is true, then it seems to follow that the universe lacks meaning outside of the meaning a mind (such as the human mind) may give it. The universe has no intentions, it isn’t sentient, it doesn’t have a plan or … (Read more)
Is / Ought Problem
TU asked for my opinion on the ‘is’ / ‘ought’ problem, so this is exactly what I’m going to do. I haven’t really cared to look into it much, so TU, feel free to correct me where I’ve muddled things up.
From what I understand, the ‘is’ / ‘ought’ problem states that we cannot derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is,’ that is, a descriptive statement does not entail a prescriptive conclusion. For example, ‘the earth exists’ does not entail the ‘ought,’ “therefore, Jim ought to be responsible and not litter”. But what of the is-statement ‘binding moral guidelines exist’, followed by the ought-statement, ‘therefore we ought to live morally’? This seems to entail an ought from an is, if you happen to believe in moral absolutes. So it would be that some ‘is’ / ‘ought’ statements are possible.
Otherwise, lacking the existence of a deity then I have to … (Read more)
Self-Interest and Selfishness
Very often the dictionary is a good repository of definitions, while at other times it causes needless headaches. I say this because I am having a problem with the definition of ‘self-interest,’ let me show you with three examples:
Oxford Dictionary:
Self-Interest — one’s personal interest or advantage, especially when pursued without regard for others.
Merriam-Webster:
Self-Interest — 1. a concern for one’s own advantage and well-being or 2. one’s own interest or advantage.
Dictionary.com:
Self-Interest — 1. regard for one’s own interest or advantage, especially with disregard for others or 2. personal interest or advantage.
It seems that ‘self-interest’ can have two different though very similar meanings. The first meaning is simply ‘concern or regard for one’s own interest or advantage’ while the second is essentially the same, with the addition of ‘without regard for others’. You see, I’m arguing that this difference (which the dictionary illustrates) … (Read more)
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