A Quick Thought on Euthyphro
Socrates’ younger friend, Euthyphro, has undertaken prosecution of his father for murdering a slave (or so Euthyphro says); that is, his father bound and tied a field laborer who, in a fit of drunken rage, killed a domestic servant. In this condition the field laborer was thrown into a ditch until word could be fetched from an Athenian diviner as to how to handle the laborer. While waiting for word, the slave died. It is with this background that the well-known Euthyphro has been formulated:
Socrates: Then, my friend, I remark with surprise that you have not answered the question which I have asked. For I certainly did not ask you to tell me what action is both pious and impious: but now it would seem that what is loved by the gods is also hated by them. And therefore, Euthyphro, in thus chastising your father you may very likely be doing what is agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos or Uranus, and what is acceptable to Hephaestus but unacceptable to Hera, and there may be other gods who have similar differences of opinion.
Socrates: We shall know better, my good friend, in a little while. The point which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved by the gods.1
I’ve never been entirely convinced that the ‘Euthyphro dilemma’ is a relevant critique of the sort of theistic belief one finds in Judaism, Christianity or Islam. The Greek pantheon of gods is another story, and it is here that the Euthyphro shines, as Socrates aptly illustrates in the first quote. For there is a significant difference between the Greek pantheon, and monotheistic belief — many (Greek gods) as compared with the few, or the one (Judaism, Christianity, Islam). It is a common reply — and I believe the correct one — to the Euthyphro to say that goodness is grounded in the character of God, so that there is a third alternative to the (now) false dichotomy Plato presents through Socrates. This answer, however, would not have been available to the Athenian mind.With respect to conflicting myths about the gods within a culture, the Euthyphro dilemma raises an extremely serious objection. Some gods could no longer be considered perfect (how would you choose?), and therefore no longer be considered gods. Such a dilemma would require a rethinking of the gods — but such a thing would be unthinkable.
I suppose I should now get to thinking about how to know what is good…
- Morris B. Kaplan, trans., The Socratic Dialogues (New York: Kaplan Publishing, 2009), 12, 16 ↩
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